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IKTRODUCTIOK
Psychological warfare, with propaganda as one of its principal
instrument, emerged in World War I as a lethal force which in some
ways was comparable to technological advances in weaponry^

Just as

aerial bombing, deadly gases and modem arms marked a new era in whole
sale killing, so propaganda was a milestone in the battle of warring
nations to control public opinion.

The war did not usher in propaganda;

its roots have been traced back to the Crusades and beyond.

It was the

"Great War," however, that produced the beginnings of today's sophis
ticated propaganda techniques.

So effective, in fact, was World War I

propaganda that some scholars hold it chiefly responsible for America's
decision to take up arms against Germany.
These scholars base their proposition on the premise that the
nation's nineteenth century hands-off diplomacy toward Europe, had it
not been influenced by British propaganda, could have preserved
American neutrality.

They contend that the war was a typical European

power struggle in which the United States had no stake.

Their thesis

further maintains that German-American grievances could have been
resolved peacefully had Wilsonian neutrality been applied in equal
measure to all belligerents*

To the contrary, their proposition

advances the argument that American diplomacy with Germany was, in
effect, a hostile neutrality.

They assert that Washington assumed an

on-guard stance against Berlin — the speedy dispatch of ultimatums at
the slightest provocation, a philosophy of suspicion and mistrust, the
threat of severing diplomatic ties.

In all of this is detected the

a

thread of British propaganda, stirring up aati*-German feeling in the
Baited States* Pushed on by London-generated publicity, according to
the argument, the United States in 191? had played out all the options
which might have averted war with Germany.

She blame reposed at the

doorstep of British propaganda*
0?he problems in assessing the validity of this proposition in
clude a survey of the development of British propaganda and a study*
Of the scope of London persuasion in the United States* Sbese
findings must he weighed against the German program in order to contrast
the extent of belligerent publicity activities. ^Finally, the American
reaction, the charges against'British propaganda and the issues in
volved in America’s decision to tafce up anas can be assessed in trying
to determine whether England induced the nation to go to war*

CHAPTER IX
€F B M 8 S I PiDPMAiBA
1b©

Of M m

Minister 1# i« Asguitb began- moving at

the outset of World War I to erg&aito a propaganda campaign, which
wouM project a favorable British image at tote and abroad* Charles
Jtoternaa wan appointed in September# 191^# to organise and direct a
Propaganda B ureau*

Btausterisaa# who hfift "bees a Member o f P a rlia m a s it

and financial Secretary to the Ikeasury* was Chancellor of the Buchy
of Lancaster

Cbairtaan of the Rational Health Insurance Joint

Committee at the tim of his appointment* Hie offices of the Xasurisae© Cmittee- were located .la. a building in London called Wellington
1
louse# and it was there that Mastorman set up the Propaganda Bureau* the Government disclosed tm facts stout the new organisation* Ashed
In Parliament to describe Mastermaa/s activities# the Prime Minister
refused to discuss the setter*

**fh© work is of a highly confidential

Ustnrai” Asquith said# ftsnd
of its 'efficiency
upon its.,2
being conducted in secret*
On another occasion a QommoKfc spokesman, Sir A*

b . Markham#

told Parliament that Mastoiman’s group was

stored with providing the Govemaent with information respecting all

1
jraaee B . S q u ire s , Br lt le h g fig s a e s te g t g a g . 2S&. M f e . S M M
States team I^lb to 1^7, lCh«toPlAa»# Mass.* Harvard Bntvemity Press#
3505)” P- 26.

a
,
2S&. teUsgg&asg Berates,
Ssaspife* S’1*01 Series, V*!.
To# House of Catenas (Londons Bis Majesty* 0 Stationery Office# 1915) #
ads*- 704-T05*

k

».3 Masterman said the Wellington

report© that appear la foreign papers/

House staff produced and distributed books, pamphlets, speeches and
Government publications dealing with the war*

The Propaganda Bureau

assisted Government officials in placing articles and interviews in
foreign newspapers*

In this same vein, the organization helped

London-based correspondents of neutral newspapers, especially American,
k
obtain information and interviews.
While the Wellington louse staff was the Government ’s principal
propaganda agency, other departments also operated miniature publicity
units*

lord Beaverbrook, the last war-time head of British propaganda,

wrote that the service ministries were adamant about operating lade
pendent agencies.

's

In December, 1916, when David Lloyd George suc

ceeded Asquith as Prime Minister, the Government began forcing the
ministries to integrate their propaganda programs* This was attributed
in part to the personality of Lloyd George end his determination to
strengthen the system.

He was credited with perhaps being the first

6

British politician to use to full advantage the press and public opinion*

3lbia., eel. 587
h
'Lord Beavefbrook, Men and Power. 1917*1918 (Loudens Hutchinson &
Company, 1956), p* 27T*
5
Ibid*
Rodney 0* Davis, Power, Public Opinion, and Diplomacy (Durham,
$* 0*; Duke University Press, 1959), pp* 226*22?*

5

He established a Department of Information and appointed Colonel John
Buchan, who had done extensive work in the Foreign Office's propaganda
program, to head it. The Department of Information was divided into
four sections* Masterman's Wellington House staff continued to
produce books and pamphlets. A political intelligence department was
charged with assessing and analysing world public opinion as it was
reflected in the foreign press* The news department prepared stories
end arranged interviews for London-based foreign correspondents* The
fourth section was a cinema department*
7
Bible to the. 'Prime Minister*

Buchan was directly respon-

Still dissatisfied, Lloyd George appointed an advisory committee
to assist Buchan*

The committee included two eminent publisher©, Lord

Horfchcllffe and Lord Beavefbrook*

Even this move failed to produce the

harmony which the Prime Minister sought*

He then placed a member of

8
the War Cabinet, Sir Edward Carson, in charge of the program.
Leader
of the Irish Unionists and Member of Parliament for Dublin University,
Carson had served from May to October, 1915, as Attorney-General in the
Asquith Cabinet* Resigning in the dissension which preceded Asquith's
downfall, Carson returned to prominence when Lloyd George appointed him
First Lord of the Admiralty.

His service in that post was marked by

bickering so intense that he was removed in July, 1917, and appointed to

The Parliamentary Debates. Official Report. Fifth Series, Vol.
109,
iLondon: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1918),
cols, 91*9-950.

8
■Squires, op* eit*. pp. 35-36.

6

the War Cabinet as Minister without portfolio* He was placed in
of all propaganda activity in September*^ Buchan continued to
head the Department of information* Carson was characterised m having
10
had .little interest in propaganda*
He resigned from, the War Cabinet
in January^ 1918. His Importance to the Department of Information did
not stem from personal achievement* rather, the significance was in the
stature of the man himself* His appointment demonstrated the high
priority which lloyd George attached to propaganda in naming a Minister
of the War Cabinet to head the program.
Despite the discord, the propaganda program apparently satisfied
the War Cabinet * The cabinet ’s report for 1917 noted that propaganda
and publicity efforts abroad were being steadily expanded,

* * the

outcome of which can be gauged by the result of the war itself."
There remained one last move to complete the streamlining

11

the

appointment of a Minister of Information. For this new post DXoyd
George selected lord Beaverbrook# publisher of The Times* and already
active in propaganda* A native of Newcastle, Hew Brunswick# Canada,
Beaverbrook had received his first experience in war propaganda- as
head of the Canadian program*

In announcing his choice to head the new

ministry# the Frime Minister praised Beaverbrook’s Canadian publicity

Ian Colvin# The life of lord Carson (Hew fork*
Company, 1937), Vol* 3# pp*l?rr*278.

The Macmillan

10
Beaverbrook, op. ctt.* p. 268

11

War Cabinet Report for the Year 1917 (Dondout
Stationery Office# 1918), p# 12.

His Majesty’s

as having been 15* » * among the most successful, perhaps the most
12
successful, piece of work of its M u d on the Allied side."
fhe
appointment was effective February 10, 1918* Of his assignment,
Beaverbrook wrote that the public clamored for a ministry which would
convince the Allies, the dominions and the .neutrals of Britain*©
capacity to win the war.1^ He noted that he had no blueprint from
which to build a propaganda organisation to meet these demandsj there
was, he wrote, u. * * nothing but a decision of the War Cabinet de
creeing that such a ministry should be formed and that I should be the
minister."1
Given that decree and the War Cabinet’s support, Beaverbrook
assembled a Ministry of Information which was corporate-like in struc
ture#

the revamped organisation included liord Northeliffe as director

Of propaganda for enemy countries,

lord Rothermere, another publisher,

m s head of the program for neutral countries. Author Rudyard Kipling
was chief of the section for home and colonial publicity.

It has been

questioned whether Beaverbrook actually was Horthcliffe's superior in
the propaganda organization.

Because both men had direct access to

the Prime Minister, there was speculation they might have had equal

12
Beaverbrook, op. cit., p. 26?.

a

rank. 7 Such a prospect -was unlikely^ certainly Beaverbrook1s
writings did not leave tbat impression# Whatever the divisions of
authority, the two m n and their colleagues helped produce propaganda
sufficiently effective to be denounced by Germany* a General Erich
Lu&en&orff after the war*

"We were hypnotised by the enemy propaganda,”

he wrote, "as a rabbit is by a snake*"

l6

throughout the war the Govenment*s publicity efforts were aided by
numerous private,groups. Among these were faculty members at Oxford
University, who wrote the "Oxford Pamphlets" j the Parliamentary Re
cruiting Committee, the Cobden Club, a nameless group of Anglican
clerics, the Loyal Council of British, Austrian and Hungarian Birth,
the Baited Workers, the Atlantic Union, the Victoria League, the Union
of Democratic Control and the Central Committee for National Patriotic
Organizations*

17

23ais last group, which offers a good example of

volunteer programs, was organized in November, 191^* The Central
Committee soon had local chapters in England and affiliated societies
throughout the Empire and in neutral countries*

British Chambers of

Commerce were used as centers for distribution of propaganda literature*
fhe Central Committee assembled a roster of 250 speakers who, by I916,

15
Harold D. lasswell, B m m m n h a technique in the World War
(New Yorks Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 20.

16
Erich Ludendorff, Jjy War Memories (London:
Cosrpany, 1919), Vol. 1, p. 30I*

Hutchinson &

IT
H* C* Peterson, Prooa^nda for War {Noman, Okla.: university
Of Oklahoma Press, I939), pp* lS*l9*

9

bad conducted 15,000 meetings* 850,000 leaflets bad been distributed
to students end 900,000 in industrial districts* Additionally, 250,000
pamphlets, boohs and other publications had been sent to neutral
nations*^
Besides its publicity agencies, Britain possessed another instru
ment which had a significant part in propaganda*

the system of

censorship, imposed at the outset of the war under the Defense of the
Eeaba Act, established a Frees Bureau to sit as watchdog on the release
Of information which might imperil national security* The Act forbade
the communication of news concerning military operations, troop move
ment and war production* Designed to provide censorship controls on the
heme front, the measure also became a guideline in propaganda operations.

19

cables.

A strong weapon in censorship was British control of the
In fact, England’s cutting of the cables which linked the

United States and Germany was called the first act Of propaganda in the
20
war . The cables were cut on August 5, 191c-.
This was only the start of a massive campaign which Britain waged
to influence world opinion*

It was an effort often hampered by discord

among governmental offices, each perhaps regarding the others with

18
Ibid.. pp. 19-20
19
Sir Edward Cooke, The Frees in War-Time (bondon*
Company, 1920), p. 88*
20
Peterson, op. cit*. p* 12.

The Macmillan

bureaucratic suspicion*

Beginning with the Wellington Bouse staff,

the publicity organisations sprouted in hither-and-yon fashion until
lloyd George appointed Beaverbrook to the new Cabinet post of Minister
Of Infonnation* The publisher of The Times consolidated and centralised
the operation*

But, this retrenching did not begin until February,

1918, long after the British had fired many of their major propaganda
Shots* Beaverbrook, for instance, was not at the command post during
the heavy publicity barrage aimed at the United States prior to the
American declaration of war against Germany on April 6, 1917*

It was

into this campaign that Britain poured much of her propaganda re
sources and talent*

CHAPTER XIX
mmm'B

m mmah

One of the few phases of British propaganda to survive the
frequent realignments was the program for the United States*

Sir

Gilbert Barker, a novelist and native of Canada, was placed in charge '
of publicity for America at the outset of the war, he served in that
post until January, 1917# when poor health forced him to resign. He
had traveled extensively in the United States, where his books had
been widely read. Settling in England, Barker became a Member of
Parliament in 1900. He was knighted in 1902, mad© a baronet in June,
1915, and a member of the Privy Council in June, 1916.1 Although
technically under Masterman’s supervision, Parker was given falr3y free
rein.

He- commenced with a Mm-mes&er staff in 191^1 this had. in-

p

creased to fifty-four by 1917*

The specifics of his campaign were

relatively- simple. Using a Who1© Who in America* he compiled lists of
prominent citizens to whom propaganda literature was sent. For mailing
purposes, he made separate growings of people according to their
p

profession, supposed intelligence and social standing in the community.
These Americans received pamphlets, articles and other materials
Which, it was thought, would be of special interest for business or

1
Squires, gfc* cit., p. 50.
2
Peterson, gg. cit.* p. 23*

12

professional reasons.

Parker also maintained personal correspondence

with influential Americans.

This group included such figures as

university and college presidents, professors, scientists, publishers
and industrialists.

He prevailed upon numerous distinguished English

men-,to write articles for American newspapers.

In the same vein, he

arranged for London-based correspondents from the United States to
interview high British Government officials.

To reach rural areas in

the United States, Parker provided 360 small American newspapers with
an English weekly newspaper which published reviews and comments on
the war.

Literature was distributed to public libraries, Young Men’s

Christian Association groups, colleges and civic clubs.

Besides this

vast outpouring of publicity, Parker also sent representatives to the
United States to discuss the war from the British viewpoint.

He

relied upon Masterman’s staff for films, photographs, cartoons,
drawings and diagrams.

It was through films, Parker said, that Britain
k
reached America’s ”. . . man in the street . . . ."
The tenor of this appeal to the United States was analyzed after

the war by Harold Lasswell, one of the early students of propaganda.
He concluded that the London attempt at persuasion emerged as a hateGermany campaign.

Anglo publicists portrayed Berlin autocracy as

satanic, violating all moral standards.

Britain, on the other hand,

was projected as the defender of the democratic ideals upon which

h
Sir Gilbert Parker, "The United States and the War," Harper1s
Monthly Magazine, Vol. CXXXVI, March, 1918, pp. 1526-530*

£»er!ca m

<5

founded.

Another student of propaganda, the date H* C.

Bet&r&m of the University of Oklahoma, placed Parker's plea ip the
context of patriotism

For an. American to he pro-British was patriotic)

to he pro-German Bordered on treason*

"In other words," Peterson wrote,

"the British captured the American flag and waved it in front of themselves."

6

Atrocity propaganda was the principal tool in London's play

on American emotions. Stories about acts of German savagery ranged
from reports of brutality in Belgium to the sinking of the Lusitania.
One of the most devastating documents was the Bryce Retort.
officially known as the Report of §|a Committee On Alleged German Outrages.

Lord dames Bryce, who- had been England's ambassador to the

Whited -States and m s a scholar of American history, headed, a Cabinetappointed committee which investigated alleged German savageries in
Belgium, $h© committee’s findings were released on Hay 12, 1915) this
■was only five days after the Lusitania went down, providing. England with
a double-barrelled atrocity blast* For some year© after the war, Britain
m s accused of releasing the report amid the uproar over the sinking in
order to reap maximum, publicity.

Later, some of the harshest critics of

London propaganda in the war — among wi10m was Walter MilXis, an American
v
scholar of neutrality — decided the timing was a coincidence.
Ihe

Las-swell, c&. cit., pp. 95-96.
6
Peterson, Q&. cit.. p. 35.

T

Walter Millis, Hoad to War (Boston:
1935)* P. 132.

Houghton Mifflin Company,

lU

Bryce Committee charged the German militarists with the wholesale killing
of civilians ". . . to an extent for which no previous war between

8/ " "

nations claiming to be civilized . * . furnishes any precedent.” ( The ^L
report related stories of murder, rape, pillage and burning^) Authenti
city of these stories was widely disputed; Frederick Palmer, an American
war correspondent, said the report itself was one of the war’s worst
9
atrocities.
Allegations about falsehoods and distortions stemmed from
the fact that the committee did not make an inspection of Belgium; nor
did Lord Bryce and his colleagues take the depositions from Belgian
refugees in England.

Ihis testimony, which formed the heart of the
10
report, was taken by twenty barristers.
Doubt was cast upon the
integrity of the witnesses, who were not under oath.

One American

journalist reported meeting people in Belgium who implored him ” . . . to
tell the English not to judge us by certain types of our refugees.”
In another instance an English magistrate referred to the refugees as
"scum."11
Ranking alongside the Biyce Report in terms of propaganda appeal
was the sinking of the Lusitania, an English liner which was torpedoed by

8
Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages (Londons
Macmillan and Company, Ltd. 1915)> p. 40.
9
Peterson, op. cit., p. 59*
10
James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 19^1), P* 203.

11
Ibid.

15

& German tl-bo&t* Justifiability of the sinking ha© been argued over the
years.

Berlin contended that the vessel was no ordinary i^rchantman,

hut rather an amed boat under orders to use its superior speed to elude
submarines * On balance* the evidence in post-war investigations tended
ip
to indicate the famitftfiia. m s not arsed.
The liner carried 4,200 cases
of cartridges containing ten or eleven tons of powder; cargo also in*
eluded 1,250 case# of shrapnel, the sinking claimed 1,198 lives; of
these, 128 were Americana, many of them prominent and wealthy.

Kurt

Hahn,’a German scholar who was lecturing on the British press during the
war, termed the sinking the great turning point in the collective English
attitude toward Germany.

nTbe empty slogan of the English inflammatory

press about *Fri^tfulness1 is filled all at once with flesh and blood
through the children that are washed up on the English coast,"yhe
w r o t e

^

what was termed a propaganda masterpiece, the British

ordered large-scale reproduction and distribution of a privately**issue&
Geamaa medal celebrating the disaster* Berlin denied that such a medal
, 14
was struck.
It was amid the furor over the Bryce Report and the husitaaia that
the Germans executed Edith Cavell, the British nurse.

Serving in Brussels,

she was -arrested on August 5, 1915# and charged with having helped English

12
Ibid* * P* 200*
13
Ibid.
14
Squires, op* cit.* p* 33.

end

soldiere and Belgian otvllim escape to Holland* B s M
/

lliWMaicadd for a&sost two ime&m betom Being tried, she confessed
tier part is the escapes end ia^licated. ei#t other pars&xa* %&*&

ctmlX also admitted that sent of the Allied m M & m ®

e&e aided

rojoisKod their unite* ttfa* Seram Cod® provided the death penalty
is. thee® «a»©s * Bespit® the efforts of American end Spanish diplomatic
officials to save tor, sh® m s shot* Barter m s reported to taire
Witten on Amrimxx eorre^asdeot that the mmmttm *sjpve os m ® m l m
for another real outburst of seatteat*1*^
la addition to mxclx propaganda Broadside®m the Barm Report* the
la^lt&afe &ad the Carol! t^eutioa, tte British also miat&med a stoa%
Ijj&xvag® of *assail aanns1* jRdk&lcitjp fire* jtafo of its focue i n on Anglo*
American ties* 55a® Osmtegft Fms&hlsts m m mmmg the major efforts %Moh
<&tagpte6 to jpsrauad® Snerimui m the tasi® of their feoads with BgyfrssaA*
On© pes^hlet

for the creation of ®m S^orisl Bwlicjsoal to hind

the Bapiro m

titfvUgr to^eiten each a d s m m t l o -step# th» pe llet

mid, also- mudd prwid® m mmmm for oioeer relations vitfe Awrica **
%

* ♦ the great Desaoem^ ^lioh m s separated from m in the eight**

rnsmh m&twp But is mdted to m hr a strong

in our time of

trial* * ■# **■id' Still snofeter pts$$&etf written By the m s Oxford
oetehiy* ea#haeiae& the need for a Concert of ter >pe* 4 first stop
w«»iim>»iwi*«iij’«''i'>'i|i ■>■■»!■«*»»«*

aj
«e * S3S»# f * 63*
16
8* A*
Som»»estei%
Idols, of Ito and Peace* _ **!W*^EWWWPIF
Oxford tfaiv&ggttr
**:•
f «■
^
^
a
j*
*^P*l*P**PPfPfllW^WWW«P^
y a p ^ ets (Londons Oxford Hfciversity
W&*19%$}$ p* 19*

17

toward this goal, the writer said, was a little-publicized AngloAmerican peace agreement.

This pact provided that in case of dispute,
17
both nations would wait a year before declaring war.
Of the British
books distributed in the United States, one by Lord Bryce reflected the
general theme of London’s attempts to influence American public opinion.
Stressing the historic bonds, he noted that both Britain and the United
States had demonstrated a democratic approach in world affairs.

For

America, this action was reflected in withdrawing from Cuba and resisting
the temptation to annex Mexican territory.

Likewise, his book praised

18
British attempts to help Africans achieve self-government.

These

words from English pens were supplemented by stories from London-based
correspondents for American newspapers.

Parker was helpful in arrang

ing for these journalists to interview British officials, ranging from
19
the Prime Minister downward.
In these interviews, too, the British
tried to project the image of idealism -- of a democracy’s battle to
defeat an autocracy.

Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, struck this chord in an interview with an American journalist.

17
E. A. Sonnenschein, Through German Eyes, Oxford University
Pamphlets (London: Oxford University Press, 191^-1915)f p. 19,
18
Lord James Bryce, Neutral Nations and the War (London:
Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 191*f), pp. 12-13*
19
It well may have been that such interviews provided a vehicle
for British propaganda* Granting this, it still was conceivable that
American editors viewed as legitimate news the comments of such figures
as Lord Grey.

18

"We want a Europe," he declared, ". • . free from perpetual talks of
shining armor and warlords*”

Bo spoke the voices of Britain*

Whether a treatise by an, Oxford scholar aimed at American intellectuals
or a patriotic film intended for the “man in the street," Parker’s
publicists viHifled Germany and wrapped England in the cloak of
righteousness.

Britain was not alone in the campaign to woo America*

SPhe voices of Germany also spoke*

20
Collected Papers of Sir Edward Grey on the European War, A Free
Europe* an interview with the Bt* Hon. Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Edward Price Bell of the
Chicago Bally Hews (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1916), p. 1*

18

“We want a Europe," he declared, " . . . free from perpetual talks of
20
shining armor and warlords."
And so went the tenor of British propaganda.

Alongside contempo

rary programs, the English effort perhaps appears crude and primitive.
Probably it can be said that changes in propaganda techniques since
World War I have been as dramatic as the development of new weapons.
Yet the psychological "firepower" of British publicity from 191^ to
1917 surely cannot be denied.

It may have lacked the subtlety, the

sophistication, the social science laboratory concepts of presentday propaganda.

The men responsible for Britain’s appeal to Americans

perhaps were not professional propagandists.

Certainly, many of them

were skilled "wordsmiths" who knew how to tell a story.

If they

lacked the refined techniques of contemporary propagandists/ London
publicists nonetheless packaged their product in the appropriate
psychological wrappings. (The portrayal of Britons as the defenders
of democracy; the projection of Germans as primitive barbarians.
Subtlety may have been missing in this tactic.

Even so, the appeal

was there, playing upon patriotism and democracy.

How good was

this propaganda? Probably the question is unanswerable.

Statistical

studies and scientific opinion polls are not available to assess
objectively the worth of London publicity.

Of necessity, such analyses

20
Collected Papers of Sir Edward Grey on the European War, A Free
Europe, an interview with the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Edward Price Bell of the
Chicago Daily News (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1916), p. 1,

19

largely take the form of value judgments.

One other yardstick, though

certainly far from satisfactory, is to compare Britain's program with
the German effort.

For Berlin, too, waged a propaganda campaign in

hopes of persuading Americans on the merits of the German cause.

chajotb w
Berlin's propagajhja. campaign
Count Johann von Bemstorff, the German Ambassador to the United
States, was in Berlin when the war broke out # He was ordered back to
Washington with instructions to "enlighten Americans on the German view*
point."3, Dr# Geheimrat Heinrich Albert of the Ministry of the Interior
came with him to set up a propaganda program*

It was Bemstorff,

however, who proved to he the articulate and public relations-minded
German representative # (Me of his first actions was to establish a
news bureau at the Bits Hotel in Hew York City,

fhere and at the

German Embassy in Washington, Journalists found refreshments, courtesy
2

and an ambassador who was readily available for interviews.

A wealthy

German-American, Hermann Sielcken, offered to pay the salary of a first*
rate American Journalist to handle Berlin*® press relations in this
country. His offer stipulated that the German Government must pay the
charges for transmission of news telegrams to Washington.

Berlin dashed

cold water on the proposal, ruling that'it was not of sufficient impor
tance to Justify the investment. "Ibis was the way the supply of news
was organised In a country that imagined it was practicing world
polities," Bemstorff wrote after the war

1
Millls, ©p. cit., p. TO.
2

Ibid.» p. J2
3
Count Johann von Bemstorff, My *fhree Years in America (Hew York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), p. 24.
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the "basis of interviews with members of the German nobility — con-

7
cerning freedom of the seas*
One of the most vocal figures in the Berlin campaign was George
Sylvester Viereck, an -American journalist of German descent* He and
three friends — a banker, an accountant and a chemist — agreed at
war’s outset that German publicity must be strengthened* The result
was establishment of a Hew fork City-based newspaper, The Fatherland.
The first issue, financed by fifty-dollar pledges frcaa each of the
four participants, was published on August 10, 191^* Bearing the colors
of the Central Powers, The Fatherland was so named as a gesture of
defiance against Germany’s critics* Viereck, who was the editor, said

8 The publication was a

the newspaper1® circulation exceeded 100,000*

voice for the expression of undiluted pro-Germanism*

o

The Fatherland

aimed sudd venomous attacks at the Wilson Administration that an em
barrassed Bemstorff tried to take control of the newspaper*

Because

the publication was self-supporting, Viereck managed to resist these

7
Selection From Papers Found in the Possession of Captain Von
Papen* Late German Military Attache at Washington* Falmouth* January
2 end
191^ (London: Printed Under the Authority of His Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 19l6), Letter Humber 12, written by E* L* Fox,
vice president and general manager of Wildman’s Magazine and Hews
Service, July 28, 191**, from Berlin to Captain Von Papon*

8
George Sylvester Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New York:
Horace Liverlght, Inc., 1930), pp. ^9-50•

9
Ibid.* p. 50
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efforts.

Revenue came from subscriptions and the purchase at below

cost of pamphlets and books, which were resold at a profit*

10

Xn its efforts to influence opinion in the Waited States, Berlin
encouraged suspicion of the Allies and tried to nourish a pacifist move*
rnsnt* Germany dwelled on the them that she was the injured party.
Encircled by powerful and hostile enemies, she had been -forced into a
defensive war * Her propagandists assailed what they claimed was the‘foes*
outrageous conduct, fhey accused England of seeking to starve the
German populace and of violating the laws of war* Germany, so her prop
aganda said, was a peace-loving nation. Woven into the fabric of this
publicity was Berlin’s proclamation that her military forces were certain
to achieve a decisive victory over the Allies* Many wrongs would be
righted in the peace which followed. Despite the holocaust of war, the
world would be a better place after Germany had smashed Britain and
France*11
Coupled with the drive to win over Americans were reports of German
conspiracies and sabotage of munitions plants and arms-laden vessels
bound for Allied ports. Perhaps the outstanding figure in these intrigues
was Captain Franz von Riatelen, who arrived in the Gnited States from
Germany in April, 1915* He began with a plot to place incendiary bombs

10
Ibid** pp* 7^-75*

11

-

•

Readings in European International Relations Since 1879. Edited
by W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney ^Hew York; Harper and Brothers,
1931)» Survey of War-QMme Propaganda literature. Principally German> P.
Chalmers Mitchell, Report on the Propaganda library, Section 23, British
Ministry of Information, 1917, PP* 559"560.

in the holds of ammunition ships * After achieving a small measure of
success there* he organized Labor's national Peace Council*

Its purpose

m s to weld together a group of labor union leaders and to demand an
arms embargo; the efforts were ill-starred.

Samuel Gompers, president

of the American Federation of Labor, put down a strike at the munitions
factories in Bridgeport* Connecticut. Strikes among longshoremen also
soon were squelched* Finally* President Wilson put Secret Service
agents on the trail of suspected saboteurs.

Derriburg returned to denaany

amid the furor over the Lusitania. With the pressure mounting* von
Bintelen left the country in the fall of 1915 end was captured by the
British*

The State Department also demanded the recall of Captain von

Papen* the naval attache* for involvement in sabotage.

Se left in

12
December* 1915 *
From this point on the course of German publicity efforts was one
of catastrophe.

Dr. Albert's briefcase* stuffed with documents con

cerning propaganda activities* was stolen on a Hew fork subway. The
thief* a Secret Service agent* turned the documents over to William G.
McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury.

He in turn passed some of them along

to F. X« Cobb* who was editor of the Hew York World and a Wilson confi
dant. The result was banner headlines about German intrigues in the
13
Uhited States.
Still another disaster followed, lames J. Archibald*
a® American writer on the German payroll, was removed from his ship at

12

Millie* op. cit.* pp. 20h-207♦

25

Falmouth while en route to Berlin. He surrendered numerous documents,
these included a proposal by Konstantin Dumba, Austrian Ambassador to
the United States* to incite unrest among Austro-Hungarian workers in
the munitions plants.

It was another Dumba suggestion which provided

the crowning blow. He wanted to try to influence the course of
American politics, contending this would provide a foreign policy
favorable to the Central Powers. These disclosures ended in Dumba*s
ih
recall*
The effect of these revelations — compounded by the invasion of
Belgium, the sinking of the Lusitania and the execution of Sdith Cavell —
added up to failure for Berlin propaganda in America.

This was the

verdict of German officials at post-war hearings. They traced the
setbacks to a gap between the propaganda image of a peace-loving
Germany and the portrait of savagery left in the wake of political and
military actions.

"The main difficulty . . . in the United States," the

German hearings concluded, "was * * * that the policy which was announced
by the propaganda itself was, again and again, interfered with by
political incidents."1^ The same judgment was made by Bemstorff, who
criticised Berlin’s failure to foresee the consequences of seeming
brutality which, he said, contradicted the publicity themes*

The diplo

mat believed that Berlin officials misread the signs when they evaluated

Ik
Ibid.. pp. 215-216.
15
Official German Documents Relating to the War, (Hew York;
University Frees, 1923), P* 2?.
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Mexican reaction to the war. Their assessment, in his view, was made
on the premise that a profit motive alone was the stimulus to which
Mericans responded.

Germany erred, he wrote, in failing to calculate

what Bernstorff called an American tendency to he guided partly by
16
emotional values in Judging European affairs.

16
Bernstorff, op. cit., p. 30

THE AMERICAN REACTION
President Wilson proclaimed American neutrality on August k,
191^, the day that Germany "began invading Belgium.

The document

announcing to the world that the United States would maintain a handsoff diplomacy was not enough.

There yet remained, in Wilson’s view,

a need to post guidelines for the American people — an attempt to
point the direction which thoughts and actions were to take.
issued an appeal to the people.

He

"The United States must he neutral

in fact as well as in name," he said, "during these days that are to
try men’s souls." The President admonished the citizenry to be im
partial in both thought and deed, to curb feelings which might reflect
1
favoritism for one of the belligerents.
There were few indicators to determine whether Americans were
neutral in fact as well as in name.

The editors of Literary Digest

declared, on the basis of a poll, that there was no belligerency
anywhere in the land'.

Whether for the Central Powers or the Allies,
2
the editors said, war sympathy was that of a distant observer.
They
made these pronouncements after a war-attitudes survey of 367 news
paper editors,

-the editors were asked to state their own feelings —

1
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
Prepared Under the Direction of the Joint Committee on Printing
Pursuant to an Act of the Fifty-Second Congress of the United States
(With Additions and Encyclopedic Index by Private Enterprise) (New
York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc.,1921), Vol. XVIII,
pp. 7978-7979.

Literary Digest, "American Sympathies in the War," Vol. LXIX,
No. XX, November l4, 1914.
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pro-Ally# pro-German or neutral; additionally# they worn asked to attempt
to determine the prevailing sentiments in their communities*

The study

disclosed that- 2kt editors m m neutral, 105 were pro-Aliy and twenty
were pra-German, Among the neutral editors# forty-three resided in the
East#. 112 la. the Midwest# fifty-one in. the South and thirty-six in the
West. fte pro-Ally list .included thirty-four editors in-, the. East,
thirteen, in the Midwest# four in the- South and eleven in the West*. Of
the pro-German editors# one lived in the East# ten in the Midwest# and
four each in the South and West# Based on the editors* judgments of
war- attitudes in. their ecmammities# 109 cities and towns were pro-Ally#
thirty-eight were pro-German and iho were neutral or divided*, Cities
Where sentiment favored Britain and France included fifty-two in the
East# forty in the- Midwest# seventy-one in. the South and twenty-six in
the test* Among conmamities classified m showing pro-German preferences#
two- were in the East# twenty-nine in the Midwest# four in the South and
three in the- lest* The neutral, or divided list of cities included twentyfour in the East# sixty-six in the .Midwest# twenty-eight in the South
mid twenty-two in the West, Hie literary Bluest* projecting, the findings
on a regional basis, placed Hew England# the South# the Southwest and the
West in the Allied camp* Pro-German tendencies were Judged to he most
deep-seated in the Central States and regions of the Far Northwest*

In

each instance these sentiments were .attributed to ancestry or. to large
numbers of recent immigrants.** It was tuestionahle whether' the. poll ■»•** and

3

Ibid.
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the judgments based on It — represented valid testing of public opinion.
Obviously, the absence of door-to-door samplings of attitudes placed
severe limitations on the survey.

Literary Digest, as a substitute,

elected to accept the newspaper editors* appraisal of the war climate in
their communities.

Conceivably, the poll represented nothing more than the

views of 367 editors.
"Whatever the state of public opinion, the nation officially was
neutral.

But on the home front as abroad, this policy proved difficult

in application.

There were substantial profits in munitions trade — and

jobs for the country*s labor force in war production.
was neutral; a proclamation attested to this*

Still, the nation

Controversy soon arose over

whether the nation could be neutral in both name and fact while selling
war goods.

Pressure for an arms embargo came from the South and the West,

where there was strong devotion to isolationism.

Grain growers and

cotton planters also resented the shortage of cargo space caused by the
shipping of munitions.

Yet, other economic interests were at stake, too.

The industrial section of the economy clamored for Washington’s blessing
on the war goods traffic.

The State Department ruled for the manu

facturers; Robert Lansing, the Department’s counselor when the war broke
out and successor to William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State, gave
the Administration’s approval on October 15, 1914.

He held that as a

neutral, the Government itself could not engage .in this trade.

Inter

national law, however, did not bar private citizens from such manufacturing

4
Merle Curti, Peace of War, The American Struggle, 1636-1936
(New York: W. W. Horton and Company, 1936>),P• 232.

and fsmsmvm*

tsmtmg said -t1m- Fresidewt had no.'power to halt the trade*

and that the Q m & r m m t waa under-no obligation to act merely because
cue belligerent could not gain access to this mar&et*^ Colonel 'S* M.
BOuse# a _fcey Wilson adviser#, arguea against an anas embargo* ■Such a
boycott#- he .contended# would have the affect ■&£ violating the nation's
neutrality by changing a situation which had arisen irrespective.of -any#
thing America had done* lurhing in the baohground, and jmrbapa over#- -:
riding the legal technieaiitles# was industrialist Andrew Carnegie's •
warnings ■An embargo -could wreck the national prosperity accruing from ■
war profits ^

■

Still# the issue was .not put to rest even after lensing's ruling and
O&rnegieVs admonishment* A Wisconsin Congressman# Bepresentative William
*T* Cary, in December# 1915# called for a boycott on the sale of all goods,
to belligerents*

He reasoned that the'Step was necessary in order to be

genuinely neutral*, .Additionally# he. said m

embargo would protect the

nation's trade from hostile acts -of-belligerents and safeguard the public
from war profiteers*^ the controversy was finally resolved-## at least

5 .
. ,
1
•
Harley Hotter#.
.gjgigli& of the Eoreigg*. Policy of Woodrow Wilson
(Baltimore! fhe Johns Hopkins Press# 193T)# P*'' 350* '

6
&arfci* m - $i& 9 P* 233*

T
Congressional Becord* Sixty*Foijrth Congress, First ■Cession# fol*
IHti Part |S> ! ^ e a d S l(Farts I' to 13)# (Washington# B.C. ; Govejwent
Printing Office.# 1916}#.. p. 932*
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m

'a domestic issue

i w

ei)t>&rga w

mi August 22*

X%6, when's. resolution calling for

permanently' tablet'%

the’House Committee on Foreign

Affair*

Eepresentative deff 'Mehemore* ■a. fer&S' Congressman*':introduced
o
the rfeolufclan* fhe move tor a boycott was not' raised again until

Wilson threatened to use it' as a club gainst Britain 'in disputes over
contraband and bl&oiaietiug* Berlin* even thou$i cut off from the market
t$r the British hloefede* did not' protest the policy until after the fettle
o
of the Marne*
'• ■■
Another fencing decision also served' to stimulate the munitions^ trade*
Beversing a ruling which Bryan fed made at the ward's outset* 'the- State
Bepartimt counselor held that American business interests could grant 1
war' credits to belligerents* ■ fhie turnabout stance* m e iii which Bryan ■
concurred* provided the credit that the'.Allies needed to purchase American
munitions* 'Again* the nation's economic demands were a factor in the
decision* 'ft was estimated that American Business firms owed' short-term,
debts of $2CXXmillieu m Europe when hostilities commenced* 'Banking
houses pressured Washington to approve war credits as' a 'means, of helping
pay these debts* Supplementing this agitation from private sources was
lanslng*'s conviction that the teeutive Branch lacked authority to prevent
'■
in
the transactions *

.Congressional Record* Sixty-Fourth Congress* first Session, Vol*
IfII*■Fart 13 (Washington, £*C.: Government Printing Office* 1916}* p. 13029*
;Ernest K* May, ffhe World War and American Isolation* 191^*1917 '
(Cacibridge: Harvard University Press* 1959;* p * &5 *

.10
fitatter*■

cit*« pp* 35^*353 *

3a

Ttm
to t& r to

hy ttm Adm inistration* zmsmei&X in terests
m

mrtinsa t m3®*

re s o to d 'to Isey issues o f

iteiifcra&ity ** tie groofelgg of war oftadfto end sale of anuoittoo to
l^LLigereato* -Wmm
i m O M i m national p M e y *

lammm# m M te# © erto a m m tm m wy
this w m t&e' dsego&liig M f t 'tefamm pelfisis.

'oil. $oopx«$& of ipittoal,. $oq$&retino8B ’** tfeos# v&o mated' ftiXl mmatiM
and a nation prime#. for m
tofLlet m

Bo^i eaurpg toned t&© <Aeafc of mentality*

its s$®liaa&to fitted tfcrn as atoa&orto#

At tfee fore*

front of th» psifiets wife &«dH'figures ao Bgyoftt auto waifaotwror

Haasy WoM end so cial rg&soBe* Jana Atoms* $b& m fo m o f itoedore
B m e v e it and Oeoemi Bernard food. were among tfcoee tubicl* spoke todosfc
■for p®p«eteiii$*
$te p oeifis ts mr© a t nork to g before tbo ® r *

1©^ York C ity m s

tli© s its o f a latio a aa Beaee CoagKoes in 29®?* w to S o sto p & ito s r
IStmrd Q i m est&Mistel an
feo thousand mmmX

Salsool of faase 'and pledged a
to st$po*fc it* $fee congress also eoiirsaea

Hi lair York City ttio tmXmrMg ymt*

Wy Wi3$. M&& M&mm tfcongbffc si©

Orteetod a toto&L gresistoalX fm pool?to* "Sltere tne rising in.tie
eom&cC&baa co lters o f

si® aaaot«ed# *’a sturdy end an-

preeMs&ted to e ^ ia t-to a i 'xmfmmtm&ing t& ld } in time tiouM is too profound
XL
to t o d itself to w * " ' ' in tontary* ifif# t o m m sleets t S b & m m of
tie ae^ly-or^aised *ftS3e*ifd Peace Sortyi aaotier tetor eauKs to ier t o t
Bwrdi t o n she mis chosen to preside at tie first l&tionai Peace Ooaireatloa

XL
fe»s Weher Idiki fffftta Addoias (to t m M
tto® a^# 1935}* P* 296.

t>» A^tetm<mfbxey

In Chicago* fbe product of that meeting was the organisation of the
national Peace Federation! again, Miss A d M m was elected chairman* She
accompanied forty^tvo other American women to m Mteraation&l Peace
!£>
Conference at *Bm Hague in April*
the social reformer m s aided, hr
such other distinguished Americans as William Howard faft, Nicholas
.Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, arid David Starr Jordan,
utoa m s president of Stanford University and leader of the American
Peace Society* the Hew forh Peace Society had the Carnegie fortune
t x m which to draw support*. Bryan, vehement in M s determination that
the Halted States must not tats up arms, resigned as Secretary of State
10 1915 because- of foreign policy disputes* He, too, turned M s full
energies to- the pacifist movement.
Els was a mission shared hy Henry Ford, whose wealth helped finance
numerous endeavors in the Quest for peace* Perhaps the most noted m s
the Ford peace ship, fated to go down in history as a misadventure in
idealism* Chartering a vessel, the Oscar II, the auto manufacturer
planned to organise a group of eminent citizens who would go- to Eurppe
and espouse the gospel of .pacifism* It was hoped they would foment public
opinion among European, neutrals sufficient to move the war from the battle*
field to the conference table * fhe ensuing, mediation, according to
preliminary plans, would bring peace 11and get the- hoys out of the trenches
hy Christmas*" Whatever its lofty humanitarian aims, the expedition, was
doomed even before the Oscar II weighed -anchor m December A, 1915, team
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radicalism.

15 Words and objectives were not enough for General Wood.

The hero of the Spanish-.American War stormed into action,, establishing
the Plattsburg Movement.
Hew York.

The General set up headquarters at Plattsburgh

There, under his direction, young business and professional

men underwent a month of military training.

Sons of some of the nation’s

most elite families signed up; it was estimated that 1,800 men studied
the rudiments of warfare — or, more aptly, turned their hand to
"soldiering" — in 1915 at Plattsburg.

It was Wood’s way of filling what

he considered to be the gap left by the Administrationfs refusal to
16
inaugurate a training program.
Meanwhile, Roosevelt’s pen and oratory became more virulent.
was criticism laced with scorn as he denounced the pacifists.

Sis

Bryan and

his followers were not the real foes of preparedness, the former President
said.

He branded them as ". . . too unspeakably silly permanently to delude

the nation." Bather, Wilson’s halfway measures on preparedness posed the
genuine peril.

17

Roosevelt was joined in the outcry by the Havy League

of the United States.

Wheeling up all the weapons of publicity it could

19
National Security League Quarterly, Vol. 1, Ho. 1 (March, 1927)
Published by the National Security League, Inc., 25 West 43rd Street,
Hew York, New York.

16
Eric Fisher Wood, Leonard Wood, Conservator of Americanism
(New York; George H. Doran Company, 1920), p. 293*
17
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Sandwiched between the pacifists and the preparedness supporters
was tbs league to Enforce the Fence* Hardly

m peace. movement

in the

sapid of. Jane Mtoss and Bryan, this organisation' was not designed to
stop the war* Bather, its purpose was to prevent future conflicts*.
Founded in 191£* the group was likened to a league of nations* % s
legal tribunal, a council Of conciliation, new concepts of international,
law, and economic and, military forces,., the Be&gus was to establish and
•guarantee 'the future peace

Wilson, in what be considered to be bis

ipost important speech up to that time, endorsed this program at the
organisation^ May, 1916# National Assembly in. Washington.2^ While not
a'pacifist movement# the league derived j&seh of its support from the
Weir York Peace -Society*. As the war clouds thickened over- the United
States in.-1916, numerous pacifists deserted to 'the other- camp>:.Carnegie,
a principal contributor to the few York Peace Society, began to frown
m anti-war activity* .Both that,group and the. league to Enforce the
gk
Feace supported .American entry .into the war*'"
'In retrospect, the .preparedness advocates calculated that' they
scored '.a decisive victory over the .pacifists* :
fbe attempt to credit
Wilsonis re-election in 1916 to a peace theme — nhe kept us out of war” **
was perhaps a superficiai Judgment . It was: questionable whether- bit

22
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return to office by a popular majority of only 568,822 votes -9,116,296 for Wilson and 8,5^7,47^ for Republican Charles Evans
Hughes — could be construed as an outpouring of pacifist sentiment.
Indeed, the President tended to identify himself with the "carry a
big stick" philosophy in June, 1916, when he led a preparedness
parade of 60 thousand marchers in the nation*s capital*^

Prepa-

rationists counted it another victory when Wilson on August 21,
1916, signed a $600 million naval construction bill calling for the
completion of 156 new ships by July 1, 1919*
its arsenals that summer and fall#

The nation was loading

Although the pacifists kept

talking, the groundswell for peace which Jane Addams thought she
saw in 1913 proved to be only a mirage.
the road to war.

The United States was on

Numerous scholars later claimed British propa

ganda was a driving force in charting America*s course.

25

Rappaport, pp. cit., p. 60.

CHAPTER VI
THE CASE AGAINST BRITISH PROPAGANDA
In the war*s aftermath, numerous scholars of neutrality advanced
the thesis that the United States need not have been a party to the
conflict.

They contended it was London publicity which almost single-

handedly laid the foundation for America*s decision to take up arms..
By playing on public sentiment and influencing the Administration,
these scholars said, England made a mockery of Wilsonian neutrality.
Greedy for munitions profits and pro-Ally at heart, the nation closed
its eyes to Anglo violations of international law.

Conversely,

Washington kept its hand on a loaded gun in dealing with Kaiser
Wilhelm*s regime.

This two-edged diplomacy — a turn-the-other-

eheek attitude toward London and an on-guard stance against Berlin — .
finally reached the point of no return.

Having played out its hand

on issues which might have been resolved in a strict application of
neutrality, Washington was left with no alternatives to war in April,
1917*

Such were the views of some scholars in analyzing the reasons

for the American decision.
of British propaganda.

In all of this they detected the thread

Indeed, they saw it as more than a thread;

rather, they conceived it to be a hangman*s noose.
Among the students of World War I who advanced this thesis
were' Walter Millis, H. C. Peterson, Harry Elmer Barnes, James D.
Squires, Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage.

Millis wrote that

for years the American public had received its day-by-day picture of
Europe through a British perspective.

He noted that few American

newspapers maintained European staffs.

In other cases Europeans

40

often manned the foreign bureaus of American newspapers.

The head of

The New York Times bureau in London was an Englishman, as was most of
his staff.

The New York World*s London correspondent was an Irishman

who had never been in the United States.

Beyond this, he declared,

those correspondents who were American citizens often had become
’’Europeanized" in thinking and outlook.

Against this background, most

New York newspapers sided with the Allies when war broke out.

These

pro-Ally publications included The New York Times, which Millis
credited with perhaps giving the most serious attention to European
events of any American newspaper. 2

That newspaper branded Germany’s

drive into Belgium, as "* . . aggression pure and simple . . . .
He also criticized The New York Times for having retained James
M. Beck, a former assistant attorney general of the United States,
to examine German and British diplomatic correspondence in an attempt
to fix the blame for the war.

"Mr. Beck seems not to have doubted,"

the author observed, "his ability to arrive, upon these partial and
4
patently unsatisfactory disclosures, at a sound judgment." The Times
printed Beck's conclusions, which Millis tenaed a "flaming defense of

1
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4
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76*

hi

the Allies and castigation of the Central Powers," on October 25,
5
191^*
Instantly popular, the article was reprinted in pamphlet
form.

Beck later expanded it into a hook, The Evidence in the Case,

which Millis called " . . . another triumph of pro-Ally propaganda."

6

Beck concluded that Germany and Austria secretly acted to impose their
will upon Europe;

he said it could not be determined whether they

intended to ignite a general war.

Beck claimed that Germany, although

having the power to induce Austria to pursue a reasonable course,
obviously prodded Vienna in taking an unreasonable position.

Further,

he contended, England and its Allies made every possible concession
in the hope of preserving peace.

Germany precipitated hostilities by

declaring war against Russia when peace conferences were still in
progress;

Berlin’s invasion of Belgium was without provocation and

violated Belgium’s inherent rights as a sovereign state; England
7
was bound by treaty to defend Belgium.
Along the same vein, Millis
pointed out that The New York Times on August 9, 191^, devoted its
Sunday magazine to a book, Germany and the Next War, by General
Friedrich von Berahardi. Within the next several days there was
overwhelming demand for the book, which contended that war was the
instrument to make Germany a great power. Millis noted that no one

5
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bothered to reprint similar works of other military writers in the
Entente countries or the United States.

Soon, the historian said,

the " . . . stupefied Germans discovered themselves convicted before
world opinion on the evidence of a few writers whom the vast majority
8
of Germans had never read. . . . "
Such material, Millis said,
9
provided highly effective ammunition for British publicity.
On the
other side of this propaganda coin was Hudson Maxim*s book, Defenseless
America. Written in the heat of the preparedness movement by an
American manufacturer of high explosives, the book was the inspiration
for a movie, ’’The Battle Cry of Peace." Discussing the film, Millis
wrote that hundreds of thousands of Americans saw this " . . . gory
piece of propaganda for preparedness.

They were . . . horrified by

its portrayal of an unprepared America overrun by the brutal . . .
soldiery of a foreign power which . . . uniformed its soldiers in a
strangely close imitation of the Germans.
Like Millis, Peterson saw in British propaganda the driving
force which largely dictated America*s decision for war.

He con

tended that United States ultimately joined the Allies because
Washington had surrendered claim to neutrality by giving material,
diplomatic and moral support to London and Paris.

8
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Norway, Sweden,

Denmark and Holland refrained from what he termed this "unneutral
conduct.11 Policies of the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands
11
enabled them to stay clear of the conflict*
The reason America did
not follow this course* he wrote* was because of British propaganda.
All the persuasiveness of this publicity -- the portrayal of German
savagery and the image of England’s fight to save democracy — was
accepted at face value in America.

"With President Wilson it was

especially important*" Peterson wrote* "influencing him to such an
extent that he subordinated the American desire for peace with his
12
own desire for an Anglo-French victory."
In building his case
against British propaganda* he relied to a great extent on the
American Press Resume. Issued weekly or bi-weekly from April 12*
19159 to August 8* 1917; this report was a focal point upon which
numerous efforts to educate American opinion were based.

One column

in the Resume was headed "Influencing the American Press."

This

represented a summary of war articles in American newspapers* pro
viding a measure of the impact of London publicity in the United
States.

The Resumes also contained detailed accounts of Parker’s

correspondence with people in America.

Such correspondence helped

pinpoint strengths and weaknesses in the British effort.

11

Peterson* op. cit.» pp. 329-330.

13
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In remedying weaknesses, according to Peterson, British propa
gandists resorted to distortion of fact.

Their techniques included

telling only that part of the truth which aided their cause;

the

utilization of background material to imply things for which there
was no evidence;

exploiting the emotions and ideals of those at whom

the propaganda was aimed;

giving their publicity an aura of authority

by using big names, quoting the enemy or appealing to legality;

they

used simple arguments and eliminated qualifying statements; they used
Ik
endless repetition.
Expanding on this theme, Peterson said the
British in some instances used outright falsehoods.
untruths relatively unimportant;
give warped interpretations.

He termed these

rather, it was easier and safer to

The author said that by ignoring mention

of good Germans, all Germans were made to appear degenerate.

By

omitting reference to evil Englishmen, the Germans were made to appear
even worse.

This technique of exploiting part-truths became high art
15
with London publicists.
Peterson singled out the Bryce Report as
a prime piece of propaganda in the context of presenting half-truths
and distortions.

For instance, this study of alleged atrocities con

tained an account of three German soldiers who decapitated a baby
while the parents stood helplessly by.

l6

The historian termed this

Ik
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merely a new version of an atrocity story told during the SpanishAmerican War.

In that version, Spanish soldiers chopped infants to

pieces, again in the presence of the parents.

17

Noting the shock many

Americans felt about supposed German atrocities, Peterson said an
attempt to offset the impact of British propaganda was lost in the
waves of emotion and frenzy which swept the country.

A group of

American newspapermen sent a telegram to the Associated Press assert
ing that charges of German cruelties and barbarous acts were ground
less.

The American journalists were in Belgium shortly after the

German invasions.

This impartial report from then neutral observers
18
had little impact in their homeland.
As did Millis and Peterson, Barnes severely indicted London
publicists.

Beyond this, he contended that resources of American

finance and industry were directed wholly to the defense of the
Allied powers and support of their propaganda.

This stance of

American economic interests was attributed in large measure to
19
greed for war profits.
The nation’s press, according to Barnes,
followed the dictates of finance and industry;

thus, most of the

leading newspapers were staunchly pro-Ally by 1915 s^id 1916.

This

favoritism extended to the point that Englishmen actually took

17
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control of some newspapers.

Chief among the sources that Barnes

used to buttress this thesis was material from journalist and author
Upton Sinclair, who accused The New York Times of trying to force
the nation into the war.

Indeed, he said propaganda was reflected in

its news columns as well as on the editorial page.

As a,n example,

Sinclair noted that the newspaper on November 26, 1915 j published
excerpts from the Thanksgiving Day sermons of eleven New York City
clergymen.

The story*s headline said:

Many Pulpits;

"Preparedness Plea From

Thanksgiving Sermons Justify War for Defense of

American Liberty and Ideals." Despite this headline, Sinclair said,
only three of the sermons contained statements which might have been
21
construed as endorsing propaganda.
Nor was Sinclair’s criticism
limited to newspapers;
magazines,

he had equally harsh words for some of the

McClure’s, he declared, became an exponent for prepared

ness even before war broke out.

Current Opinion dropped its policy

of reprinting from other publications and introduced propaganda of
its own.

Literary Digest, supposedly an impartial survey of public

opinion, became an organ of hate.

22

As for Barnes, he did not con

fine his charges of pro-Ally sentiments to the press and finance
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and industry.

Indeed,, he accused American officials of falling prey

to Anglo publicity.

He singled out Walter Hines Page, American

ambassador to Britain during the war.

Hie historian charged that

the diplomat’s pro-British leanings impaired American neutrality.
Foreign policy from l$dA to 1919 j he wrote, would have been far dif
ferent had the United States possessed at the Court of St. James an
23
ambassador who was competent, fair-minded and judicious.
Page’s
". . . maladministration of his duties," Barnes wrote, "was a chief
obstacle to American impartiality in dealing with the belligerent
, 2k
nations after 191*t."
Another scholar of neutrality, C. Hartley
Grattan, provided much of the ammunition for Barnes.

Page was

guilty, Grattan wrote, of swallowing " . . . the whole of British
,25
propaganda, hook, line and sinker.
Hie ambassador failed to
realize, he added, that Germany was not alone in the use of propa
ganda;

Britain also resorted to it.

German opinions as propaganda;

Page constantly repudiated

he invariably supported English

opinions, no matter how much distorted, as the truth.

"This propa

ganda achieved the amazing coup," Grattan observed, "of writing

23
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. . . the official communications of the American ambassador to
26
London.M
Less venomous than Barnes in his attack on Anglo publicity,
Squires concluded that British propaganda was at least a major con
tributing factor in bringing America into the war.

There never will

be agreement, he wrote, on the degree to which England*s publicists
influenced the Washington decision.

"It was not the cause," he said,

"for American entrance into the World War.

But that it was a cause,

and a powerful one, it seems impossible for the historian today to
27
deny."
He termed his conclusion identical with that of another
28
student of war propaganda, Ralph Lutz.
Whether Squires and Lutz
actually reached identical conclusions is perhaps open to question.
Unlike Squires, Lutz was far less specific in attempting to weigh
the impact of British propaganda on America.

Whereas Squires termed

the publicity "a cause, and a very powerful one” in charting
Washington*s course, Lutz said only that propaganda " . . . was not
,,29
the determining factor in forcing the United States into the war.
Certainly, the two scholars were in accord on the issue that propa-.
ganda was not the principal cause.

Yet, Lutz did not even attempt

26
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to assess the influence of propaganda as a powerful influence.

In

this sense, his analysis was not identical with that of Squires.
Squires wrote that two immediate causes — German resumption of
unrestricted warfare and interception of the Zimmermann Telegram —
30
underpinned,jthe Washington decision.
In addition, he found six
underlying causes.

-

These included the Anglo-American bonds forged

by culture, language and history;
over Germany's invasion of Belgium;

indignation in the United States
a fear, especially along the

Atlantic seaboard, that a Berlin victory would imperil American
safety;

the fact that by 191? the nation had a tremendous stake in

an Allied victory;

shock at the cruelty and brutality of modem war

fare, epitomized by the sinking of the Lusitania; finally, the impact
31
of British propaganda.
"Skillfully interweaving itself into the
other five elements," Squires wrote, " . . . the British propaganda
32
was a force of real potency in compelling the decision of April 6."
As witness to the skill and cunning of London publicists, he offered
Ambassador Bemstorff.

Declaring that Americans were fair game for

anything clothed in sentiment, the German diplomat said that British
propaganda exploited this circumstance " . . . with the greatest
refinement in the case of the German invasion of ’poor little

30
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31
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Belgium** the shooting of the *heroic nurse** Edith Cavell, and other
incidents.

„33

Squires also noted that Secretary of the Treasury

McAdoo praised the expertise of London publicists. McAdoo wrote that
an artistic unity and singleness of purpose characterized British
propaganda in the United States. London gradually built up the im
pression that the Germans were barbarians.

Eventually, he wrote, the

British convinced a large number of Americans that German soldiers
3*
had cut off the hands of Belgian children.
Two other scholars of neutrality, Borchard and Lage, declared
that Anglo publicity, playing on a naive America, succeeded in making
35
the United States an instrument of England's foreign policy.
It
was their view that Washington, neutral in stated policy, was un
neutral in practice almost from the war's outset. Their documentation
for this came from Ray Stannard Baker, who wrote that by October,
191^, the United States was no longer neutral;

heavy trade carried

with it, even if informally and undeclared, a commitment to the
36
Allied cause.
Borchard and Lage maintained that the United States
adopted a hostile attitude toward Germany when grievances arose over

33
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neutrality.

Conversely, the policy toward Britain was a go-softly

approach even on issues of major importance.

Legal questions might

have been approached with far more understanding had the United States
been neutral in practice as well as in name.

37

As one example of this

double-edged diplomacy, the authors cited the American position con
cerning armed merchantmen.

In what they termed an "unsustainable

position," Washington held that German submarines had no right to fire
on or sink an aimed merchantman which had Americans on board*

And

this despite the British Admiralty *s orders to ram or fire at submarines on sight. 38 Thus, in the view of these two scholars, the
United States undertook to defend British merchantmen from attack by
their enemy.
Borchard and Lage saw the influence of Lansing in this two
pronged neutrality.

As early as July, 1915> they said, Lansing

admitted his pro-Ally sympathies.

During the furor over the Lusitania,

he drafted a personal memorandum concluding that Berlin was hostile
toward all nations with democratic institutions.

Declaring that

Germany must not be allowed to win the war, his memorandum said
American public opinion had to be conditioned for eventual abandonment of neutrality in favor of joining the fight for democracy.

37
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Borchard and Lage also noted Lansing*s admission that diplomatic corre
spondence to Britain was couched in language designed to help prevent
a rupture in relations.

The Secretary of State said that his dis

patches were steeped in verbosity, opening up new topics of discussion
rather than ending those in controversy*

Short, emphatic correspond

ence, he wrote, carried the peril of damaging beyond repair the bonds
of friendship between the United States and England.

Often, Lansing

said, he feared his notes might have demanded too much of Britain.
All of this careful attention to detail was in preparation for the
40
day when America would enter the war on the British side.
Borchard
and Lage also emphasized Wilson’s pro-Ally sentiments.

For example,

only eight days after issuing the Declaration of Neutrality, Wilson
told Colonel House that a German victory would change the course of
41
civilization and make the United States a military nation.
Xt was
in this context — a two-edged diplomacy shaped largely by British
propaganda — that a gullible America took up arms in 1917; accord
ing to these scholars of neutrality.
It is, of course, impossible to know what direction American
public opinion and Wilsonian diplomacy would have taken had that
propaganda not been present.

Many of the works that attempt to pin

point London publicity as the fundamental cause for American entry

40
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into the war were written on the eve of World War XI,

Indeed, scholars

of neutrality were dealing not only with the past; perhaps it is fair
to say their conclusions may have been influenced in part by what they
saw, or thought they saw, in the contemporary scene of the 1930*s:
The specter of a repetition of ISlk-lSYJ9 with British propaganda at
the forefront as a force which might lead the United States into an
unnecessary war.

One Wilsonian scholar, Arthur S, Link, believed

these students of neutrality attached too much importance to London
publicity.

Writing in 195^*/ he detected a superficiality in studies
k2
of World War I propaganda.
Minimizing London propaganda as a

molder of public opinion in the United States, he expressed doubt that
Americans of the 191^-191? scene were as uninformed about the origins
^3
of the war as a later generation believed.
Nor did he conclude that
German propaganda was a failure. "Far from being inept and unsuited
to the American mentality," Link wrote, "much of the German propaganda was skillfully executed . . . ."

In his view, Berlin’s

publicity effort did not fail because of blunders.

Rather, it was

because a majority of thoughtful Americans had made up their minds
on the causes and issues of the war ahead of the time that either

k2
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German or British propaganda agencies were effectively at work in the
United States.

At the root of this thinking, he wrote, was a fear of

German naval ambitions in the Caribbean and a mistrust of Kaiser
Wilhelm and his military advisers.

Even more important were Germany* s

actions immediately before and after the outbreak of hostilities.
Failure to submit the Serbian question to arbitration and violation of
Belgian neutrality were regarded as defiance of the moral conscience
45
of the world.
It was not, Link wrote, British propaganda, atrocity
stories and emotionalism which shaped the preponderant American
thinking during the first months of the war.

Rather, opinion was

shaped by a fairly keen analysis of world affairs and an awareness
of German actions.

This thinking was strengthened by subsequent

events, especially submarine warfare.

It was easy to overestimate

the importance of the Bryce Report, he said, noting that Wilson
46
refused to believe the atrocity stories.
These questions then are
posed:

Was it a gullible America, propelled by British propaganda,

that went to war in 1917? Or was it an America pursuing an inde
pendent course?

45
Ibid.

DECISION FOB WAR
As late as December 1916, Wilson still hoped that American peace
overtures might silence the guns of August and relight the lamps of
Europe*

In the previous two and one-half years both London and Berlin

had strained his diplomacy to the breaking point.

England, abandoning

the provisions for rights of neutrals set forth in the Declaration of
London, laid down her own rules on contraband and search and seizure.
Washington protested with regularity, claiming the rules were unduly
harsh and often in conflict with international law.
frequently were unsatisfactory.

London’s responses

The widening gulf in Anglo-American

relations during the summer and fall of 1916 posed complex issues on
the lengths to which Wilson and the Congress would go in enforcing
rights of neutrality.

Confrontations with Britain were tempered in part

by U-boat warfare and other bones of contention in German-American
relations.

It was indeed, a two-front diplomatic struggle for Washington.

The stage for conflict between England and the United States was
set when war broke out. A pivotal point was the Declaration of London,
drafted on February 26, 1909* but never ratified by any nation. Despite
this weakness, it was the only concise statement of neutral trade rights
existing in 191^.

The agreement allowed great freedom for non-belligerent

commerce and specifically exempted from seizure as contraband such
important American exports as copper ore and cotton.

1
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Washington requested
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that both London and Berlin adhere to the Declaration.

Germany made

her approval contingent upon British willingness to abide by the pact;
England said she would observe the agreement only with severe modi
fications. She quickly issued a succession of Orders in Council which
drastically changed the Declaration’s provisions on belligerent rights
to interfere with neutral commerce. For example, the 1909 agreement
classified balloons, airplanes and their accessory parts as conditional
contraband — subject to capture only if it was shown they were destined
for an enemy Government.

Britain proclaimed these items absolute contra

band — liable to seizure if they were bound for a foe or to territory
2
the enemy owned or occupied.
England’s unyielding attitude convinced
Lansing that it was futile to press for belligerent adherence to the
Declaration. Wilson, adopting the same view, approved Lansing’s note to
Britain withdrawing Washington insistence on the agreement as the basis
for American demands concerning neutral trade rights.

The message,

sent on October 22, 191^, proclaimed treaties and international law as
the criteria for American rights.

The United States reserved the right

to lodge a protest each time her trade privileges were violated.
London responded on October 29 by expanding the list of prohibited
exports.

Classified as absolute contraband were motor tires, rubber,
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mineral oils, gasoline and unwrought copper. Placed in the conditional
k
category were hides, pigskins and leather.
The British Admiralty on
November 2 classified the North Sea as a war area; neutral trading
5
vessels were warned of grave dangers from mines and warships.
England
on March 11, 1915,? began a naval blockade of Germany.

British prize

courts were empowered to condemn goods sent to the Scandinavian countries
and Holland which might have reached Germany by evasion of neutral export
boycotts; additionally, the courts also could confiscate goods which might
replace other items to be shipped from the neutral stock of Scandinavia
or The Netherlands.

Raw goods en route to neutral ports were condemned

if it was thought they could be manufactured into products which might
6
reach Germany.
Wilson’s initial response was merely a dispatch assert
ing his expectation that the blockade would not violate international
law.^ In August, however, London placed cotton on the absolute contra
band list, jeopardizing the American South’s economy.

A furor followed;

on October 21, Washington protested in a communication which amounted
Q
w. . . to an indictment of the entire British policy. . . . "
The dis
patch censured England’s practice of detaining neutral cargoes without clear
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proof of destination and announced the United States would not be bound
by decisions of British prize courts. Although the protest stronglycriticized the blockade, there was no demand to lift it; nor did
Washington threaten reprisals.

q

Legality of the blockade was at issue

because London did not proclaim it as such.

Even so, the effect was

the same, because the British fleet closed nearly all water entrances
to Germany.^
London took some of the hostility out of the contraband lists by
making substantial purchases of American cotton, helping stabilize the
crop’s price.

11

But other grave issues counteracted this gesture.

Britain and France on July 7> 1918, formally discontinued all observance
of the Declaration of London.

Instead, they would be bound by the
12
principles of international law.
London fomented another storm on
July 18 by blacklisting eighty-five American firms; this prohibited
British subjects from doing business with any of these companies.

The

action was based on the belief that the firms had commercial links with
Germany,

Particularly, they were suspected of doing business with

Germans in South America. Washington protested on July 26, a Wednesday.
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A memorandum issued with the formal communication noted the blacklisting
had aroused an intense anti-British feeling in the United States.
Because of this animosity, the State Department told Britain of plans to
inform American newspapers of the protest on Saturday. 13 The complaint
accused London of brushing aside neutral trade rights in blacklisting
the companies.

"It is manifestly out of the question," the protest

asserted, "that . . . the United States should acquiesce in such . . .
1a
punishment to its citizens."
England attempted to mollify the State
Department and American public opinion.

Sir Cecil Spring-Riee, British

Ambassador to the United States, assured Washington that specific
grievances would be taken up and, if justified, individual firms removed
from the list. 15 Such gestures lacked the substance to calm Washington.
Wilson pressed for retaliatory powers;

Congress responded, enacting

legislation which permitted the President to stop the importation of
all goods from the Allies and to deny clearance to ships that would not
transport products for the blacklisted firms.

In effect, he was armed

with the economic weapons to embargo the export of munitions to the
Allies. l6 The stage was set and the props at hand for a showdown; the

13
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16
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curtain did not go up. This was due in part to another stage. Along
side Britain stood Germany as a powerful belligerent with which Wilson
had to deal in his pursuit of neutrality.
Countering what German statesmen called London’s "mockery of all
principles of the laws of nations," Germany on February

1915#

designated the English Channel as a war zone. Neutral ships were warned
to stay clear of those waters.

Accidents were bound to occur, the

decree said, even though the German Navy had been instructed not to fire
on neutral ships.IT Washington said it would construe any loss of
American lives or vessels at German hands as ". . .an indefensible
violation of neutral rights. . . ." 18 The American position posed a
dilemma for Germany.

On the one hand there was Chancellor Theobald

Bethmann-Kollweg’s determination to keep the United States out of war;
this was countered by the German Admiralty’s insistence on U-boat war
fare .19 Then came the torpedoing of the Lusitania. Washington told
Berlin that expressions of regret and offers of reparation, even if they
satisfied international obligations, were not sufficient to justify the
use of submarines against neutrals.

The communication, emphasizing the

right of Americans to travel where they pleased on the high seas, asked

IT
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Berlin to disavow the acts of its submarine commanders and to make certain
that there was no recurrence.

20

Germany’s response simply challenged

the facts concerning the sinking and invited prolonged debate; she
21
offered little hope for curtailing of U-boat warfare.
Wilson had to
make a key decision;

Whether to go softly as advocated by Bryan or to

pursue the aggressive course urged by Lansing and House.

The President

elected the latter course and Bryan resigned in protest. Washington
dispatched a second note to Berlin on June 9> 1915j declaring the United
States could not admit the legality of the English Channel as a war zone.
To do so, the communication said, would negate the rights of United
States shipmasters and American citizens to go where legitimate business
took them; this included travel on belligerent ships. Washington viewed
op
these rights as inviolable.
Despite the aggressiveness in stating the American position, little
real headway was made in resolving the differences.

Although Wilson’s

attitude toward Germany was described as patient, he refused to retreat
from the position that German submarine commanders must spare American
lives.^3 Then came another crisis.

Two Americans perished when a U-boat

20
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sack the British liner Arabic on August 19, 1915*

In the uproar which

followed, Bemstorff went the limit — and perhaps even exceeded his
authority —

in trying to soothe the Wilson Administration.

He assured

the State Department that U-boats henceforth would give due warning
and provide for the safety of non-combatants before torpedoing
24
passenger ships.
Wilson by now largely was keeping his own counsel
in shaping American policy toward Germany.

Both House and Lansing

advised drastic action after the Arabic was sunk.

House wanted to con

vene an emergency session of Congress; Lansing favored severing
relations with Germany.

The President rejected both proposals.

25

The next major confrontation between the two nations did bring a
threat from Washington to break off diplomatic ties.

The French steamer

Sussex, an unarmed vessel used for Channel crossings, was torpedoed
without warning by a U-boat on March 24, 1916.
four Americans aboard were injured.

Several of the twenty-

The torpedoing of the steamer was

called, to that point in the war, the gravest crisis in German-American
diplomacy.

26

Wilson went before Congress to assail Berlin.

The German

Government, he said, had been unable to put any restraints on submarine
warfare. He reiterated the American position:
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incompatible with the principles of humanity and the long-established
rights of neutrals.

27

The State Department sent an ultimatum to Berlin

on April l8. U-boat attacks, the dispatch said, were flagrant offenses
against what the United States considered to be ", . . the sacred and
indisputable rights of international and universally recognized dictates
of humanity. . . . "

If the U-boat raids continued, the communication

said, Washington's only recourse would be to sever diplomatic relations.

28

This stance again pitted Bethmann-Hollweg against the Admiralty; again,
the Chancellor emerged victorious.

He won from the Kaiser and the

Admiralty the most far-reaching concessions yet made to the United States.
In a dispatch on May 4, Berlin stated it would go to the utmost lengths
in order to preserve German-American harmony.

Berlin believed that

naval warfare should be confined to belligerents, thereby guaranteeing
freedom of the seas for neutrals. With this view, the communication said,
Germany had instructed her naval forces not to fire on merchant ships
without giving warning; additionally, submarine commanders had been
ordered to make provision for saving human lives.

The only exceptions

would be where vessels offered resistance or attempted to escape.
stipulated one important reservation:

Berlin

Washington was expected to under

take negotiations with Britain which would restore freedom of the seas
for neutrals. A cutback in submarine warfare, therefore, was contingent

27
Congressional Record, Sixty-Fourth Congress, First Session, Vol.
LIII, Part 7 (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916),
p. 6422.
28
Foreign Relations, 1916 Supplement, op. cit., p. 234.

64

upon America’s ability to end the blockade.

If Washington failed in

these efforts, then Germany would reserve complete liberty of action
regarding future submarine warfare.

29

The United States refused to

recognize this condition; an American note informed Bethmann-Hollweg
that the submarine policy could not be "* . . contingent upon the course
or result of diplomatic relations between the Government of the United
OQ

States and any other belligerent Government* . . .

Germany did not

reply to this dispatch.
With Berlin’s modification of U-boat warfare, there appeared in the
late fall and winter of 1916 a kind of impasse in American pursuit of
neutrality. Wilson attempted to press his case against London, lodging
protests and arming himself with weapons to counter what he considered
to be British encroachments on American commerce. Yet, he did not
resort to economic sanctions which might have crippled the Allied war
effort.

The influence of House and Lansing may have tempered the

President’s actions. And whatever the complaints against Britain, the
nation’s war prosperity was very real. There also was the upcoming
election.

These were the issues immediately at hand.

Beyond all of

these — and perhaps overshadowing them — was Wilson’s fervent wish to
see peace restored. Re-elected in November, the President made an effort
toward that end. His bid was preceded by a German peace feeler on
December 12, 1916. The overture, transmitted through diplomatic channels

29
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of America and other neutrals, renewed the contention that the war had
been forced on Germany.

Boasting of military and economic strength,

the Kaiser’s Government pronounced itself ready to fight to the end.
Nonetheless, without offering specific details, Berlin declared a
31
willingness to negotiate.
Wilson dispatched a communication to
belligerents on December 18 suggesting they outline their conditions for
peace,

©lis request for disclosure of specific demands placed Germany

in an embarrassing position.

Both Bethmann-Hollweg and Arthur Zimmermann,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, believed a statement of peace
terms would be disadvantageous to their country.
a Wilson role in negotiations.

Zimmermann also feared

Distrusting the American President, the

German Foreign Secretary wished at all costs to prevent him from having
a hand in a settlement.

32

Because of this unwillingness to state her terms and the suspicion
of Wilson, Germany framed an ambiguous reply.

Berlin referred to its

own overture of December 12 and asked the warring nations assemble on
neutral ground to consider peace.

There was no mention of terms. 33 The

reply was an important turning point in German policy toward the United
States.

For one thing, the vagueness made it easier for the Allies to

31
Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Germany ,
op. cit., p. 275*
32
Bimbaum, op. cit., p* 332.
33
Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Germany»
op. cit., p. 290 .

66

rebuff all peace feelers. More important, it hastened the deterioration
of prospects for creating a peace alternative to U-boat warfare.

The

Berlin communication, and the skepticism toward Wilson which was a factor
in its wording, compounded Germany*s problems in using submarines while
remaining at peace with the United States.
Replying on December 29 to the proposals for talks, the Allies
branded the Berlin offer as being without substance.

HA suggestion with

out any conditions for initiating negotiations,?l Britain and France
said, "is not an offer of peace.

y Wilson kept his hopes alive despite

these setbacks. Addressing the Senate on January IT, 1917, the
President urged the family of nations to adopt the Monroe Doctrine on .
an international scope.

He suggested that no nation should seek to

dominate another; rather, all nations, both great and small, should be
free to develop according to their own lights. 36 These idealistic
aspirations soon were washed away in the currents of realism.

Indeed,

although he did not know it, time had run out even before his address
to the Senate. On January 9, with the prospect for peace negotiations
apparently doomed, Germany decided to renew unrestricted submarine warfare.
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Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Ludentiorff, who had taken
over the Supreme High Command in August, 1916, were unrelenting in the
quest for total U-boat offensives.

Bethmann-Hollweg managed to stay

them until the January 9 Crown Council meeting, when the militarists
won their case in a presentation before Kaiser Wilhelm.

Unlimited

submarine attacks would leave England prostrate within six months, well
ahead of the time that America’s possible entry into the war could be
decisive.

Ludendorff said the Supreme High Command would not be respon

sible for the war if U-boat restrictions continued.

Bethmann-Hollweg

warned that giving the submarines license to kill might bring the United
States into the war.

Willing to risk conflict with America, the Kaiser
37
approved full revival of submarine action.
The next development came on the very day Wilson proposed a Monroe

Doctrine for the world.

Britain on January 19 intercepted the Zimmermann

Telegram to the German Embassy in Mexico City.

3y January 24 the tele

gram had been decoded and the contents transmitted to Washington.
Zimmermann revealed Germany's plan to resume unrestricted U-boat warfare
on February 1.
struggle.

Berlin hoped the action would not draw America into the

Failing this, Zimmerraaim proposed a German-Mexican alliance.

For Mexico, there was the promise of German financing and the lure of
regaining territory in Texas, Hew Mexico and Arizona.
ment, of course, rejected the proposal.

38

The Mexican Govern-

Berlin's official notice to
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Washington concerning resumption of a^total submarine offensive was
delivered on January 31. Accusing the Allies of rejecting peace over
tures in favor of a war to crush her, Germany said full U-boat warfare
was the only recourse. After February 1, all ships, including neutrals,
would be sunk in a war zone around Britain, France and Italy. 39 Wash
ington reaction was immediate; a communication from Lansing to Bemstorff
on February 3 announced the severing of German-American relations.

The

Secretary of State noted the American warning of April, 1916, concerning
40
unrestricted submarine warfare.
Going before Congress to announce the
diplomatic break, Wilson still sought to fan the embers of his peace
aspirations.

"• . .1 refuse to believe," he said, "that it is the

intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned
4l
us they will feel at liberty to do."
Only twenty-three days later the President was again before Congress —
this time to seek approval for the arming of American merchantmen.

The

Germans had sunk two American vessels, the Housatonic and the Lyman M.
Law. Shipowners1 unwillingness to put their vessels to sea in the face
of the U-boat threat was damaging American commerce. Wilson expressed
hope of averting war.

"The American people do not want it," he declared,
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2j.o

“and our desire is not different from theirs.”

Yet, the loss of lives

and shipping continued.

Germany sank seven American ships during
ks
February and March with a loss of thirty-six lives. J To Lansing, this
prefaced only one course — war. His certainty of the outcome was
expressed in a communication to the President on March 17* Aimed con
flict was inevitable, the Secretary of State wrote, because of Germany’s
continuing attacks on American shipping. An incident was bound to
kk
arise which would provoke war.
Wilson clung to his goals for peace.
He was told at a Cabinet meeting on March 20 that public pressure might
force his hand on the war issue.
replied.

"I do not care for public demand,” he

“I want to do right, whether popular or not.”^

even as he spoke.

The end was near

That very day he and the Cabinet decided to call an

emergency session of Congress and seek a declaration of war against
Germany.

The nation’s lawmakers convened on April 2 to hear the

Administration’s request.

The President decried Berlin's war on non

belligerent shipping, the German sabotage campaign in the United States,
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and the intrigues of the Zimmermann Note* Wilson said that vessels of
every kind, including hospital ships hound for Belgium, were being
sent to the bottom.

"The . • • German submarine warfare against

commerce is warfare against mankind," he asserted.

k6

Congress concurred;

the American decision was a declaration of war against Germany.
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CONCLUSION

World War I ushered in numerous new techniques of warfare; these *
advances were not limited to technology. 'In a social and political
sense, the emergence of propaganda as a force to influence public opinion
was perhaps as significant as developments in weaponry. '-The war was not
confined to the battlefield; there was the "other front" where the
belligerents fought to win world-wide public favor for themselves.
Indeed, so intense was this struggle — the war of propaganda

that

some scholars held it chiefly responsible for bringing America into the
battle against Germany.

They proclaimed British publicity as the driving

force behind Washington*s decision to take up arms*
London began at the war*s outset to build a propaganda machine.
An operation largely veiled in secrecy, it often was frustrated by
departmental friction and duplication of effort. Not until Lloyd George
became Prime Minister did the English achieve a semblance of unity in
this field*

He first established a Department of Information and placed

a Cabinet Minister, Lord Carson, in charge of it. Even this did not
end the discord.

In February, 1918, the Prime Minister took the final

step in a long series of realignments.

He gave the program Cabinet

status by creating a Ministry of Information; to this post he appointed
Lord Beaverbrook, who had been active in propaganda work throughout the
war. Assisted by Lord Northcliffe, Beaverbrook assembled a propaganda
machine which was almost corporatelike in structure and efficiency.
While the two publishers reaped much of the credit, another figure was
almost solely responsible for British publicity in America.

Kiis was
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Sir Gilbert Parker; lie and his staff mailed pamphlets, articles and
other materials to Americans*

Distinguished Englishmen wrote articles

for American newspapers and went to the United States to espouse the
British cause. To reach rural areas, Parker provided 3^0 small American
newspapers with an English weekly which published reviews and comments
on the war.

There also were films, photographs, cartoons, drawings and'

diagrams for American consumption* Films, Parker said, enabled Britain
to reach the "man in the street."

To make contact with American intel

lectuals, scholars at Oxford University wrote the Oxford Pamphlets.
Often grounded in scholarship, these pamphlets nonetheless conveyed the
tenor of England's appeal to America.
This plea portrayed Berlin autocracy as satanic, violating all moral
standards.

Conversely, Britain was projected as the defender of demo

cracy. One of the principal tools in London's play on American emotions
was atrocity propaganda. Reports of German savagery ranged from stories
about brutality in Belgium to the sinking of the Lusitania and the
execution of Edith Cavell. ,These stories sought to ignite an America
which, in the Anglo view, was already sympathetic toward England by
ties of history and culture.

The British words did not go unchallenged.

Germany, too, sought American favor.

Like London, Berlin faced severe

problems in trying to set up a workable program.

There was very little

departmental cooperation, a difficulty which was compounded by jealousy
and the militarists' lack of understanding about propaganda. Ambassador
Bernstorff emerged as the main figure in Berlin's publicity campaign.
Articulate and public-relations minded, he set up press offices in both
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Hew York City and Washington where American journalists could interview
him and get the German viewpoint.
In their attempts to influence Americans, the Germans tried to foster
mistrust of England and France and sought to nourish a pacifist move
ment.^ Berlin dwelled on the theme that it was the injured party;
surrounded hy powerful foes, Germany had been forced to go to war.
was actually a peace-loving nation.

She

This theme was marred in large

measure by reports of sabotage in war plants and aboard munitions ships
bound for Allied ports.

Documents captured in both Britain and the

United States gave an air of credibility to German intrigues.

At post

war hearings, the Germans said their propaganda in America failed
because of the image left by these conspiracies and the implications of
brutality in such incidents as the sinking of the Lusitania. Americans
did not accept Berlin’s publicity, the Germans concluded, because it
was contrary to the realism of political and military actions.
Whatever the overtures of British and German propaganda, President
Wilson admonished Americans to be neutral in fact as well as in name ♦
On a lesser scale, this course proved almost as difficult on the home
front as abroad.

There were substantial profits to be had in war goods

production and munitions trade.

The question was whether the nation

could reap these economic gains and still be truly non-belligerent.
The State Department ruled that while the Federal Government could not
engage in this traffic, there was nothing to bar private citizens from
manufacturing and selling aims and munitions to the warring nations.
Likewise, the Administration permitted private sources to grant war

’jk

credits to the belligerents*

These two measures cleared the m y for the

nation to thrive on wartime trade.

Not so easily resolved, however, was

the rift between the pacifists and the preparationists. The preparationists considered themselves victorious when Wilson signed a $600
million naval construction bill.
Abroad, the nation’s neutrality was put to rigid tests by both
England and Germany.

Britain's enforcement of the blockade and policies

regarding blacklisting and contraband provided continuing friction in
Anglo-American relations.

Washington, after concluding it was futile

to press for British adherence to the Declaration of London as the yard
stick for neutral trade rights, protested with regularity what were
viewed as infringements on American commerce.

Indeed, the denunciations .

challenged the principles of London’s blockade and rules on contraband.
The protests represented an indictment of the entire British policy.
American hostility reached a peak in the summer and fall of 1916 when
Congress enacted legislation empowering Wilson to effect an arms embargo.
This was the aftermath of the British blacklisting of eighty-five
American firms which London suspected of having links or dealing with
Germany.
Whatever the resentment against England, Wilson never used the
economic weapons at his command.

In part, this was attributable to the

strain which Germany placed on Washington.

The sinking of the Lusitania,

the torpedoing of the Sussex, and reports of German intrigues and sabotage
in the United States provided a sore point which brought an American
threat to sever relations in the spring of 1916.

Berlin responded by
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ordering its submarine commanders not to fire on merchant ships without
giving warning; additionally, provisions were to be made for the saving
of human lives.

By winning these concessions from the German Admiralty,

Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg managed to avert a break with Washington.
And Wilson, in spite of the hostility toward Britain, was able to turn
his attention to peacemaking in the winter of 1916.

Preceding his

proposal was a Berlin offer which, while acclaiming Germany*s strength
and certainty of victory, announced a readiness to discuss peace.
There was no mention of terms.

Wilson then asked the belligerents to

get forth their conditions for ending the war. Neither Bethmann-Hollweg
nor Zimmermann wanted to do this, believing it would be to Germany’s
disadvantage.

Additionally, Zimmermann mistrusted the American Presi

dent and feared he might have a role in negotiations.
Against this background, the German response to Wilson was simply
a reiteration of Berlin’s previous offer and a suggestion that belliger
ents assemble on neutral ground to discuss the issues.

This reply

represented an important turning point in German-American relations; it
made the Allies* task easier in rebuffing the overtures.

More important,

the reply hastened the deterioration of prospects for creating a peace
alternative to U-boat warfare.

Britain and France spurned Berlin’s bid

for talks, largely on the premise that terms were not declared.

Amid

these setbacks, Kaiser Wilhelm elected to take the advice of his mili
tarists who demanded renewal of total submarine offensives.

Bethmann-

Hollweg warned of the perils this course held in provoking America.
For Wilson, peace aspirations still lived.

He went before the Senate on

T6

January 22 to outline his peace aims, suggesting the family of nations
adopt the Monroe Doctrine as a world-wide yardstick in keeping the
peace. Unfortunately, time had run out on him. Britain intercepted
the Zimmermann Note, which revealed plans to resume unrestricted sub
marine warfare and proposed a Gerraan-Mexican alliance if the United
States entered the war.

Then, on January 31> Berlin notified Washing

ton of the return to all-out U-boat attacks, including raids on neutral
shipping.

This brought an immediate break in relations, Just as

Washington had warned in the spring of 1916. After first resorting to
the arming of American merchantmen, Wilson sent before Congress on
April 2 to ask for a declaration of war against Germany.

In his

request, he cited the continuing loss of American lives and ships to
U-boats, the Zimmermann Note and German sabotage.

Submarine warfare

against commerce, he asserted, was ”• . • warfare against mankind.”
This was the background against which America took up arms.
Some students of neutrality concluded in post-war studies that it was
British propaganda which drove the United States into the war.

In the

view of these scholars, London publicity played upon American sentiment
and made a mockery of Wilsonian neutrality. They accused House,
Lansing — and even the President — of strong pro-Ally feelings despite
the nation*s hands-off diplomacy*

These students contended that the

nation, greedy for war profits and eager for an Anglo victory, actually
practiced a double standard of neutrality.

The United States, they

charged, closed its eyes to English violations of international law*
For Germany, on the other hand, there was an on-guard stance and the
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speedy dispatch of ultimatums at the slightest provocation.

This pro-

Ally attitude prevented finding solutions to issues which might have
been resolved in 1915 and 1916.

Finally, in the spring of 1917>

America had played out its hand; there was no alternative to war.

In

all of this — according to such scholars of neutrality as Peterson,
Barnes, Millis, Borchard, and Squires — the role of British propaganda
was overpowering.
The validity of these charges must be weighed against the course
of events in America's relations with both England and Germany.

What

ever the impact of London’s publicity, the controversies involving
Britain’s blockade, blacklisting and contraband cannot be ignored.

They

were serious enough that both Congress and Wilson favored economic
measures which, if executed, could have seriously hampered the Allied
war effort.

While the Administration did not utilise the available

powers of economic boycott, Washington was sufficiently provoked in the
summer and fall of 1916 to have these weapons ready.
this move were substantive in nature.

The issues behind

Regardless of the British sympa

thies which the highest leaders in the Administration may have held,
they did lodge severe protests with London.

Whether Parker's publicity

helped soften the stands which might have been taken -- including an
embargo — cannot be determined.

It can be said, however, that munitions

trade and granting of war credits served the nation*s economic interests.
Instituting a boycott would have ended the war profits.

These factors

must be weighed in assessing American policy toward Britain.

Perhaps

T8

it amounted to greed; by any definition, the trade was legitimate.
Even the Germans did not question it until after the Battle of the Marne.
On the other side of the coin, the confrontations between the
United States and Germany ran a two-year course and more before war
was declared.

In the interim between the sinking of the Lusitania

and the decision to take up arms, there were serious provocations —
losses of American ships and lives to German torpedoes.

In these

situations Wilson largely kept his own counsel; he did not yield to the
severe demands made by Lansing and House.

Indeed, the statement that

the President was both firm and patient with Germany seems to be a
fair assessment. The figure of Wilson looms large, overshadowing those
of his key advisers, in analyzing German-American relations. He rejected
the go-softly policy which Bryan advocated in dealing with Berlin; by
the same token, the President ruled out the harsh measures favored by
Lansing and House. American neutrality and a desire for peace surely
were Wilson*s two principal motivations.

He still was actively bidding

for peace in January, 1917* His was not a war policy; he bowed to war
only when the nation*s interests were directly at stake and it became
clear that Germany meant what she said about total U-boat warfare.
The loss of American ships and lives proved it. Washington severed
relations with Berlin on February 35 two more months elapsed before the
decision was made to take up aims. With these grave issues widening
the gulf between Washington and Berlin, it is questionable whether
British propaganda somehow drove the nation to war.

Perhaps it is more

likely that Kaiser Wilhelm flung the door wide open to American entry
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into the conflict when he accepted the advice of his militarists over
that of Bethmann-Hollweg. Of course, it can never he known what would
have been the case, as far as American neutrality and ultimate entrance
into the war is concerned, had British propaganda not been present.
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